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Summary
Private Pensions as Corporate Debt
This paper begins by examining the ways in which pension liabil-
ities are and are not like corporate bonds. Some conceptual issues involved
in valuing future pension obligations are then discussed.
The second section considers the advantage to firms & fully funding
their pension obligations and the reasons why many firms nevertheless choose to
have unfunded obligations. The third section then summarizes the results of
research on the effect of unfunded pension liabilities on the equity value of
firms.
The first three sections thus consider the role of pensions at the
level of the individual firm. The two sections that follow focus on the current
and future role of pensions in the national economy. More specifically, section
4 examines the effect of private pensions on the nation's saving rate, paying
special attention to the implication of unfunded pension obligations. The fifth
section then discusses the impact of inflation on the private pension system and
the likely future for indexed and unindexed private pensions.
Martin Feldstein
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 868—3905Private Pensions as Corporate Debt
Martin Feldstein*
Private pensions are now a central feature of the asset and liability
structure of the American econonr. More than half of all employees have some
form of pension coverage. The value to employees of their prospective pension
benefits is a major part of their total financial wealth and generally repre-
sents the only way in which these individuals hold the debt of American cor-
porations. Indeed, since the great majority of American householdshave little
or no other financial assets,the substitution of future pension benefits for
current wages is their only contribution to financing the accumulation of
non—residential capital.
Similarly, the promised pension benefits represent major liabilities
of corporations. For many corporations, the present actuarial value of these
future benefits constitutes a greater liability than the conventionaldebts in
the form of bonds, commercial paper, and bank loans. By the end of 1981,the
aggregate value of just the vested pension liabilities ofnon—financial cor-
porations will probably exceed the corresponding value of all oftheir other net
liabilities.
*president, National Bureau of Economic Research, Professor of Economics,
Harvard University. This paper was prepared for the NBER Conference on Debtand
Equity, April 2 and 3, 1981. The paper is in part a summaryof two earlier
technical studies that were done in the current project and presented in
Feldstein (1980) and Feldstein and Seligman (1980). The paper also draws on
Feldstein (1978),
1 In 1912, nearly half of personal tax returns reported no interest and
dividend income and more than 15% reported interest and dividend income ofless
than $500. These figures are quite consistent with survey data thatindicate
that in that year more than half of the households with a head under the ageof
65 held no financial assets and 80% held financial assets of less than$5000.
See Feldstein and Feenberg (1981).
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It is worthwhile therefore, as part of the NBER general study of the
changing character and role of debt and equity in the American econonr, to
examine the private pension as a form of corporate debt. This paper begins with
an analysis of the ways in which the pension liabilities are and are not like
corporate bonds and then considers some of the conceptual issues involved in
valuing future pension benefits. In the second section, I discuss the advantage
to firms of fully funding their pension obligations and reasons why many firms
nevertheless choose to have unfunded obligations. The third section summarizes
the results of research on the effect of unfunded pension liabilities on the
equity value of firms.
The first three sections thus consider the role of pensions at the
level of the individual firm. In the two sections that follow, I focus on the
current and future role of pensions in the national economy-. More specifically,
section 14 examines the effect of private pensions on the nation's saving rate,
paying special attention to the implications of unfunded pension obligations.
The fifth section then discusses the impact of inflation on the private pension
system and the likely future for indexed and unindexed private pensions.
I should emphasize that the ideas presented in this paper are more in
the nature of a progress report than a finished body of research. The final
section of the paper comments briefly on a number of questions that remain to be
investigated.
1.Evaluating Pension Liabilities
The typical pension plan is a corporate promise to pay retirement bene-
fits based on the retiree's number of years of employment and his level of ear-.
flings during his immediate pre—retirement years. Although an employee generally—3—
forfeits any claim to benefits if he leaves the company after only a fewyears of
employment, the benefits of an employee whostayswith the firm for some minimum
number of years become "vested," i.e.,theemployee becomes entitled to bene-
fits evenif he subsequently leaves thecompany before retirementSage. Firms
can set aside tax deductible funds to meet these vested future benefits obliga-
tions and the income on these assets is not taxed to either the corporation or
the pension plan itself. Some firms fund all of their vested pension obliga-
tions, but many do not.
Because the promise to pay future pension benefits is like the promise
to pay interest and principal, a pension obligation is similar in manyways to
an outstanding corporate bond. This is particularly true when the promised
benefit is fixed in nominal terms, as it generally is when an employee is
already retired. For an employee who is still working, the level of future
pension benefits is not fixed but depends on future earnings. But even for such
current employees, the level of vested benefits is fixed in nominal terms.
There are, however, a number of significant differences. First, pen-
sion obligations are less visible. IJnlike corporate bonds, the pension obliga-
tions are not recorded on the corporate balance sheet. Present accounting rules
requireonly that firms indicate the extent of their unfunded pension benefits
in the notes that accompany the balance sheet. Although this information must be
providedin the annual 10—K report that is filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and that is available to the public, there is no requirement
to include any information about pension obligations in the firm's annual report
to its shareholders._14_
Second, pension obligations are more flexible. Althoughthe ERISA
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act) rules require firms tofollow a
policy of funding all new pension obligations within 30 years(and all pre-
vious pension obligations in hoyears),firms have considerable discretion about
timing in the choice of a specific funding plan. Moreover,if a firm experien-
ces temporary financial difficulties, getting permission to delayfunding is
both easier than postponing debt service and likely to have fewerserious con-
sequences for the firm.
Third, the consequences for the firm of not being ableto meet its pen-
sion obligations are also limited by government guarantee. If the pension plan
or the company becomes bankrupt, the pension obligations becomethe respon-
sibility of the federally financed Pension Benefits Guarantee Corporation(PBGC)
which has recourse to the firm only to the extent of 30% of thefirm's equity.
The flexibility of timing and the PBGC guarantee reduce the valueof
the pension obligation relative to a bond with the same potentialannual cash
outlay. How much the flexibility and guarantee are worth depends uponthe cir-
cumstances of the particular firm, with a greater effect the lesssound the
firm's financial position. In the remainder of this section, I shall ignore
both of these features, implicitly assuming that the firm's positionis so
strong that they are irrelevant.
There is a fundamental difference in the tax treatment of bondsand
pension obligations that has an important quantitativeeffect on the valuation
of pension obligations although it does not imply a qualitativedifference
between bonds and pensions: all the payments made to a pensionfund are tax
deductible while the principal repayments on a bond are not taxdeductible. If—5—
the corporation pays a marginal tax rate of 50% (including both federal and
state taxes) a $1 payment of pension benefits by the firm reduces the firm's
after tax profit by only fifty cents. Similarly, a $1 contribution to the pen-
sion fund to meet future benefit obligations also reduces the firms tax by
fifty cents and therefore only reduces its after tax earnings or assets by fifty
cents. In contrast, repaying $1 of corporate debt involves no tax reduction and
therefore reduces assets by a full dollar.It is wrong therefore to regard pen-
sion liabilities as equivalent to bonds or loan balances. Indeed, it may be
more accurate to treat each dollar of ordinary debt obligations as equal to $2
of net pension obligations. Equivalently, it is important to measure pension
obligations in terms of their net-of-tax cost.2
Going beyond the comparison of pension liabilities and bonds, it is
important to recognize that the tax deductibility of pension contributions is
logically different from the non—taxability of the earnings of pension fund
assets. The fact that these earnings are not taxed has important implications
for calculating the present value of future benefit obligations. In general,
the present value of future benefit obligations cannot be calculated by
discounting future benefits in the customary way by either the pre—tax or after
taxrate of interest but depends on the extent to which (or the speed with
which) those benefit obligations are funded.
An example will clarify whythisisso.3 Considera firm with an obli-
gation to pay a single pension benefit of $100 ten years from now. The firm can
2 Note also that a debt repayment reduces gross assets without changing ear-
nings while the payment of a pension obligation reduces both earning and assets
according to accounting conventions.
3Amore formal analysis is presented in section one of Feldstein and Seligman
(1980).—6—
borrow at an interest rate of 12% on its high quality bonds.Alternatively it
can buy the high quality (i.e., virtuallyriskiess) bonds of other firms for its
pension fund and receive a yield of 12% on those bonds.Its combined federal
and state marginal tax rate is 50%. These figures imply thatthe net cost of
borrowed funds to the firm is 6% and this is the rate thatit should use to
calculate the present value of any future pension benefit contributions.
However, once a dollar has been contributed, it accumulatesat 12% inside the
pension fund.
Thus if the firm chooses to fund its future obligation immediately,it
needs only contribute $32.20 since, at 12%, this will accumulateto $100 at the
end of ten years. Moreover, since the current contribution wouldbe tax deduc-
tible, the net cost to the firm would be only $16.10; equivalently,the
existence of the $100 promised benefit reduces the current equityvalue of
the firm below what it would otherwise be by $16.10. In contrast,if the firm
does no funding of the benefit, it must pay $100 at the end of10 years. This
will have a netof—tax cost to its shareholders at that time of$50. Like other
future costs and benefits that are known with (virtual) certainty,this $50 can
be discounted to a present value of the firm's net interestrate of 6%. The
present value calculated in this way is $27.92.
The decision to postpone funding the benefit or to fundit gradually
over the ten years implies a present value that depends onboth the pre—tax
interest rate (12%) and the net—of—tax interest rate(6%). For example, if the
firmdecidesto wait5yearsand then to fund fully at that time, it must make
This assumes that a small increase in borrowing does not changethe interest
rate that the firm must pay.a contribution then of $56.7 for a net—of—tax cost of $2cS,3i;i.e.,$56.Ilt
accumulates at 12% to $100 at te end of 5 years. The present value of the
$28.31, discounting at 6%, is $21.20.
Note that, as these calculations suggest, immediate funding is cheaper
than any postponement. This implies that firms should in principle fund their
obligation as soon as possible. I will return to this subject in the next sec-
tion.
In practice, firms typically calculate the present value of the vested
pension obligation by discounting the future actuarially expected invested pension
obligations by an estimate of the yield that they will obtain on their pension
portfolio.5 The value of the unfunded vested pension obligation is then calcu-
lated by subtracting the value of their pension assets from this measure of the
pension obligation. For the funded portion of the benefits, this is an
appropriate comparison; the discount rate is conceptually correct, there is no
need to adjust the funded obligation for its tax deductibility since no further
tax deduction will be allowed. But for the unfunded benefits, the usual method
of calculation typically overstates the true value. To see this, note that the
$100 promise benefit would conventionally be valued at $32.20 instead of $21.92.
Only if the benefit obligation is very far in the future (or growing very
rapidly) does the conventional procedure of using a discount rate that is too
high more than offset the error of not reflecting the tax deductibility of the
contribution or of the direct pension payment by the firm.
5 In many cases, this is not even a realistic estimate of the risk—free return
but only a conventional assumption designed to be conservative.—8—
In addition to the issues of tax deductibility and of the choice of the
discount rate for funded and unfunded obligations, there is the very basic question
of whether the obligation should be defined to include only vested benefits or a
broader measure of actuarially expected benefits. The narrow focus on vested
benefits may understate the true value of a firm's obligation. The accounting
requirements focus on the vested benefits because a future benefit does not
become a legal liability of the firm until it is vested, i.e., until the employee
is entitled to the benefits even if he quits the firm or is fired. The typical
plan might provide that an eriployee with 10 years or more of employment has
vested benefits of 2% of his final year's earnings per year of service; e.g., a
20—year employee gets Lo%ofhis final year's earnings. In this case, the
vested pension obligation completely ignores the employee with nine years of
service even though he is very likely to stay long enough to become vested.
Similarly, the vested benefits of the 6)-i year old, employee makes no allowance
for the fact that he is very likely to wait until he is 65 before retiring. The
calculation of vested benefits is intentionally myopic. Should it be?
The purpose of evaluating pension liabilities is to assess the firm's
future expenses in excess of the value of the services it will receive for those
payments. The clearest case to consider is the vested benefits of a retired
worker. Since the worker is already retired he will provide no further
services; the present actuarial value of his pension rights is a net liability
of the firm. Consider next a 6)-i—year—old worker with 20 years of experience who
will get )40% of his final wage if he retires at age 6L and )42% if he waits another
year. Jerenr Bulow (1919) has noted, in a very provocative paper, that the—9—
employee's opportunity to obtain higher pension benefits by waiting anextra
year is irrelevant if the firm and the worker take theextra benefits into account
in setting the wage for the extra year of work. More specifically, if the wage
for that year is set so that the wage plus the increased value of pension bene-
fits equals the value of the employee's services for that year, there is no
excess cost to the firm associated with the employee's postponedretirement.
The same argument applies to the individual who has had 9 years with the firm
and is just about to become vested. If his wage during the tenth year of
employment is set so that the sum of the wage and the initial valueof the
vested pension are equal to the value of the tenth year's services, there is no
excess compensation in the prospective benefits.
Although Bulow's analysis is logically sound, it is not clear how rele-
vant it is in practice. I know of no evidence that wages are adjusted to offset
unusually large accruals of benefits. But the relationship between wagesand
pension benefits accrual is an empirical question that remains tobe investi-
gated. Moreover even if there is not a perfect offset with the implied large
jumpsin a few particular years, there maybe a general tendency for the rela-
tionship betweenearnings and seniority to reflect the accruing pension bene-
fits. If enirical work establishes that there is less than a full wage offset
of the accruing benefits, then the evaluation of pension obligations must go
beyond vested benefits in order to give an accurate picture ofthe firm' s net
obligation.—10-.
2. The Pension Funding Puzzle
As I noted in the previous section, the firm can reduce the real net
cost of its pension obligations by funding them as fully as possible. This can
be shown even more explicitly as follows. Recall that, in the example in the
previous section, the firm has a pension benefit of $100 to pay in 10 years,
with a constant 12% interest rate on its own debt and on the obligations that it
can hold in its pension fund, and has a marginal tax rate of 50%. Funding the
benefit imriediately would involve the net cost of $i6.io.
Assume now that the firm does not wish to fund the future benefits out
of its current earnings since it wishes to use those funds for internal invest-
ment and dividends. It therefore borrows the $16.10 and uses the borrowed
money to fund the future benefit. At the end of one year, it owes interest of
12% on the loan of $16.10 or $1.93. Since this interest is a deductible
expense, the net cost of the interest is 91 cents (or 6% of the loan). 4ssume
that the firm borrows the 97 cents and thus increases it loan to $17.01. The loan
grows in this way at 6% a year until, at the end of the tenth year, it has grown
to $28.83. The firm can repay this loan in the tenth year and use the accurnu—
lated pension fund of $50 to discharge its pension obligation. In this example,
there is no change in the firm's cash flow under either method except in the
tenth year at which time the immediate funding method saves more than 140% of the
cost that would be incurred with no advance funding.
The implications of the example are perfectly general. The firm can
borrow at a net—of—tax interest rate and then use the funds to earn a pre—tax
interest rate within the pension fund. Since borrowing and holding debt do not—11--
change the total debt position of the firm and pension fund combined, it is esen—
tially an arbitrage opportunity.6 The puzzle then is why many firms are not
fully funded.7
Some firms may not fund more rapidly because the tax law limits the
speed with which unfunded benefit obligations can be funded with tax deductible
contributions. I suspect that this can account for at most a small fraction of
the firms, although evidence on this point remains to be collected.
One potential explanation of the apparently irrational behavior of
firms is that the management of those firms believes that the securities market
is irrational, i.e., that portfolio investors would recognize the additional
debt that appears on a firm's balance sheet but not the unfunded pension liabi—
lity or the asset that it holds in its pension fund. If that were true, it
would be in the interest of current share holders to leave the pension liability
unfunded. Although the evidence sumsiarized in the next section of this paper
indicates that securities investors do not make this mistake, some firms nay
still be attributing that error to them.
A closely related explanation is that firms may be reluctant to fund
more rapidly because the pension contribution would reduce the year's reported
earnings (even if financed by borrowing) and this in turn might reduce the firm's
market value if securities investors do not understand the reasons for the lower
reported earnings. Firms should in principle be able to avoid this problem by
6
There is a separate issue of the type of asset in which the firm should
invest its pension fund. Black (1980) and Tepper (1980) have argued that firms
should hold only debts in their pension funds since equity investments (if any)
are best made on the corporations' own accounts.
7 In a sample of large manufacturingfirms, Seligman and I (1980) found that
about 25% of vested benefits were unfunded.—12—
providingsuch information to shareholders and to the market if itdecidedto
accelerate the funding of. pension liabilities.
Firms may be reluctant to borrow in order to finance pension contribu-
tions because of the irrational rules of credit rating organizations, bank
regulators, and the like. In an irrational world, it is optimal to behave
irrationally ——orat least in a way that by logical standards appears to be
irrational. Credit ratings, for example, depend on the amount of conventional
debt that a firm has, on the ratio of earnings to assumed debt service obliga-
tions, and the like.Arì increase in conventional debt used to finance a pension
contribution would appear incorrectly to increase the leverage of the firm and
this might result in a lower quality rating for the firm's debt obligations.
Because certain classes of portfolio investors cannot invest in securities with
a low rating, reduction in the credit rating would raise the firm's cost of
capital even if informed portfolio investors recognized the error in the lower
rating.Similarly bank loan officers maybe judged byregulatorsand by their
superiorson the basis of the conventional balance sheetcharacteristics of the
firmsto which they makeloans.A firm that weakens its conventional balance
sheetmay lose more through higher costs of borrowing or reduced credit availabi-
lity than it gained by earlier funding of its pension obligation. Again, we
lack evidence on the actual or presumed importance of these effects. Moreover,
the entire argument of this paragraph assumes that there are not other investors
and lenders who are prepared to arbitrage away such "irrational" credit—rating
yield differences. With sufficient arbitrage, the arguments of this paragraph
are not valid.—13—
The existence of the Pension Benefits Guarantee Corporation may
encourage firms to remain less than fullyfundedin order to increase the
expected value of that compulsory insurance. Since the P.B.G.C. guarantees the
benefits to the employees, it removes the natural concern of the enloyees or
their unions to keep pensions more fully funded.
Finally, there is the possibility that managers whose salaries or
bonuses are based on performance may want to see accounting profits and assets
increasedeven if that means lower real net—of—tax profits to shareholders.
Again, such behavior should not be necessary to satisfy the self interest of
management since the company's board of directors couldmodify the rules at the
suggestion of management to make the interest of shareholders and management
coincide.
In short, the pension funding puzzle ——or,more accurately, the non—
funding puzzle ——remainsto be solved.
3. Pension Obligations and Share Prices
As part of the NBER Project on the Changing Role of Debt and Equity,
Stephanie Seligman and I studied the effect of unfunded pension obligations
on the equity value of a sample of manufacturing firms. The analysis used
the inflation—adjusted income and assets that large firms have been required to
provide for 1916 and subsequent years.
The basic approach of the study was to relate the market value of a
firm's equity to the replacement value of its physical assets, its earnings and
history of earnings growth, and the value of its debt. The firm's expenditure-l4-
onresearch and development and the "beta" coefficient relating movements in the
firm's share price to movements of an aggregate share price index were also
included in the basic specifications of the statistical valuation equation. By
taking these determinants of the market value of the firm into account, we
could estimate whether there was an additional statistical effect on the
equity value of the unfunded vested pension liabilities reported by the firm.
The evidence for our sample of nearly 200 manufacturing firms was con-
sistent with the conclusion that share prices fully reflect the value of
unfunded pension obligations. Since the conventional accounting measure of the
unfunded pension liability has so many problems, it would undoubtedly be more
accurate to say that the data are consistent with the conclusion that the
securities market appears to accept the conventional measure as the best
available information and causes share prices to be reduced by a corresponding
amount.
Of course, not all shareholders need be aware of unfunded pension
liabilities for this to be true. If a sufficient nur-iber of securities analysts
and investors representing a significant amount of assets take these liabilities
into account, they can make it unneccessary for others to do so.
For nearly 200 majormanufacturingfirms in the sample, unfunded pen-
sion liabilities averaged 4.9% of the replacement value of physical assets in
1911. Since the pension assets themselves averaged 13.5% of the replacement
value of physical assets, these firms had funded approximately 15% of their
vested pension liabilities. These figures also imply that the value of vested
liabilities are extremely large, i8.L% of the total value of plant, equipment
and inventory.—15—
It is of course possible that the statistical estimates are spurious.
For example, firms that do not fully fund their liabilities may have other
characteristics that also depress share values and that were not taken into
account in our analysis. For example, firms in very strong financial positions
may choose to fund fully while firms with weak earnings may seek to increase
reported earnings by not funding as much. The bias could however go in the
opposite direction. The firm that expects to have more cash flow in the future
may postpone funding. Similarly, the firm with cash that it does not know how
to invest may choose to fund more at present. Further analysis of the reasons
that firms do not fully fund would help to resolve this statistical issue.
s I noted in the previous section, if the conclusion that the market
reflects unfunded liabilities and share prices is correct, this eliminates one
reason why firms might wish to be less than fully funded. The evidence that the
market recognizes unfunded liabilities also helps to explain why the stock
market has not risen more in the past decade. The specific estimates derived
from the current snple of firns implies that the unfunded vested pension liabi-
lities were 1%ofthe market value of the firm's equity in 1911. If the equity
value of the firm was reduced dollar for dollar by its unfunded liability, the
recognition of these liabilities lowered the average share value by about 7%.
Statingthis in different words, in judging the extent to which shares are
currently undervalued, the measure of the "true" equity value of the firm (i.e.
the replacement value of physical assets minus net debt) should be reduced by an
amount equal to about 7%ofthe current market value of equity.—i6—
Our investigation of the effect of unfunded pensions liabilities on
share prices was motivated by the relevance of this issue in assessing the effect
of private pensions on the national saving rate. Before commenting on the
implications of our findings, I shall discuss the more general issue of the
impact of private pensions on national saving.
.PrivatePensions and National Saving8
Although private pensions represent a very substantial amount of capi-
tal accumulation, it is not at all clear from a priori considerations alone that
they actually achieve any net increase in the nation's capital stock. Private
pensions ry only represent a change in the form in which individuals save, a
substitution of pension assets for an equal amount of direct saving. Indeed,
since the untaxed pension fund earns a higher rate of return than the tax-
paying individual, the pension permits the same level of retirement consumption
to be financed with a smaller initial volume of' savings.
The existence of private pension plans increases aggregate national
saving only if it induces individuals to postpone consumption, i.e. ,toconsume
more in retirement and less when they are working.9 Pensions may of course
induce such a shift in consumption in response to the higher rate of return.
8 For a more complete discussion of this subject, see Feldstein (1918).
9 This statement implicitely assumes that the existence of the private pension
does not alter the total amount of government spending in each year. The pri-
vate pension plan per se involves a postponement of tax liability from the
earning years to the retirement years. This in itself increases private
savings. But the lower tax payments imply an equal decrease in government
saving or increase in government borrowing. This change in the timing of tax
payments therefore leaves national saving unchanged.—11—
If the increase in retirement consumption is large enough, saving will rise.
While this condition will not be satisfied for all taxpayers, it will be for
some.
In addition to those who increase their desired saving, there is
another important group for whom the private pension represents forced saving.
The very substantial fraction of the population with little or rio directly held
financial wealth implies that forced saving may be quite important. These indi-
viduals may be imjopic or may believe that their Social Security benefits will
provide at least as imich as they want for retirement. In any case, they are
forced by their private pensions to have more retirement consumption than they
would otherwise choose. Although they might in principle offset this extra pen-
sion wealth by borrowing, it is extremely difficult to borrow any substantial
amount without specific collateral. Whether it is this difficulty or just an
aversion to the accumulation of debt, few individuals reach retirement with
enough financial liabilities to offset a significant fraction of their pension
benefits.
Pensions may also increase saving by inducing individuals to retire
earlier than they otherwise would. Since pensions are only paid when an indivi-
dual re-tires, individuals have a strong financial incentive to retire as soon as
they are eligible for the maximum pension. When an individual retires at an
earlier age, he has more years of consumption to finance and fewer years in
whichto accumulate the retirement assets. Induced early retirement would
therefore increase saving even among individuals who do not respond at all to
thehigher rate of return.
Although the empirical evidence on this issue is weak, it seems likely—18—
onthe basis of existing data that the promise of private pension benefits does
not induce an equal or greater reduction in direct personal saving. But, even if
direct personal saving falls by less than the amount required to fund the private
pension, total private saving may fall if the pension is in fact not funded.
say "may" rather than "will" because, even with no funding, total saving may
increase.What happens depends crucially on the response of shareholders.
To understand this, consider the case in which the firm trades a
promise of a future pension benefit for a reduction in current wages below what
they would otherwise be. Assume that the employees recognize the value of the
promised pension and reduce their saving by enough to keep retirement consump-
tion unchanged. If the firm uses the extra profits that result from the lower
wages to fund the pension, there is just a substitution of one form of saving
for anotherj°
But what if the firm does not fund the pension liability and instead
adds the extra profits to retirement earnings and invests them in the firm.
This too is just a substitution of one form of saving for another unless the
shareholders respond to the increased earnings and assets by consuming more.
This increase in consumption would occur if the firm's share price rose in
response to the increased plant and equipment, i.e. ,ifthe shareholders ignored
the increased pension liability in valuing their shares. The evidence
(presented in the previous section) that share prices do reflect the unfunded
pension liability implies that shareholders would not be misled by the increase
10 This ignores the differences in tax treatment between pensions and direct
saving, a simplification that greatly facilitates discussing the current point
without losing anything essential.—19—
in assets. Instead, the change in corporate assets and the change inpension
liability would offset each other and leave the share price and therefore share-.
holder consumption unchanged.
A similar argument applies if the firm uses the extra profits to
finance higher dividends. Since the higher dividend does not reflect higher
real earnings or greater assets, the share price would remain unchanged and
shareholders should not increase their consumption response to the higher level
of dividends. Unlike the analysis of retained earnings, this argument requires
both that the share price does not rise and that shareholders base theircon-
sumption on the value of their wealth and not on dividends per Se. Since some
macroeconomic evidence does suggest that dividends are irrortant as a deter-
minant of consumption, unfunded pension liabilities may induce some additional
consumption on the part of shareholders.
The effect on the nation's savings of an increase in private pensions
is thus quite complex.It seems likely that there is some increase in retirement
consumption and that employees do not reduce their direct savings by the present
value of the pension obligation. To the extent that these obligations are
funded or used to increase retained earnings, aggregate savings increase. To
the extent that the extra cash flow that results from unfunded benefitsgoes
into dividends, the net effect is more ambiguous.
In concluding this discussion, it is worthwhile to erhasize the dif-
ference between unfunded private pension benefits and unfunded Social Security
benefits. Because the promise of future pension benefits is an obligation of
corporate shareholders, it is reflected in a market price that reduces the
net wealth of current shareholders. Because the promise of private pension
benefits makes current shareholders poorer, they have an incentive to save more—20—
either directly or through corporate retained earnings. The same is not true
for Social Security. The promise to pay future benefits implies a higher tax on
future employees but involves no incentive for current employees to save more.11
Thus whatever the depressing effect of either type of pension on the direct
savings of employees, private pensions will result in a larger increase in
national savings (or smaller decrease) than would result from an equal amount of
Social Security.
5. Private Pensions and Inflation1-2
Much of the recent discussion about the relation between private pen-
sions and inflation has emphasized the adverse impact that the unexpected rise
in inflation during the past 15 years has had on pension recipients and on the
performance of pension funds. Some of those who have commented on the problem
have even concluded that the private pension system cannot survive in an infla-
tionary economy. It is important, however, not to confuse the unfortunate conse-
quences that followed when inflation caught pensioners and pension fund managers
by surprise with the inability to adjust to future conditions, even uncertain
future conditions.
In a previous study, I concluded that a steady rate of inflation, far
from destroying the pension system, would actually increase the share of total
savings that goes into private pensions. The reason for this conclusion is that
the advantage that the private pension has in exempting its portfolio income from
11 This ignores the observation of Robert Barro (1916) that current individuals
may wish to save more in order to increase their bequest to compensate their
children for the higher taxes that those children will face as a result of
increased Social Security benefits.
12 This section summarizes conclusions developed in Feldstein (1980).—21—
taxation becomes greater when there is inflation. This in turn reflects the fact
that individuals pay tax on the full nominal interest income that they earn on
direct saving and therefore pay a tax per unit of capital that rises with the
rate of inflation; in contrast, of course, since pensions pay no tax on their
interest income, the tax differential per unit of capital rises with inflation.
Similarly, individuals pay tax on nominal capital gains on stock (as well as on
dividends) and this capital gains tax also implies a tax per unit of capital
that rises with the rate of inflation. Thus on both debt and equity, inflation
increases the yield differential between household and pension funds in favor of
pensions.
The relative yields on debt and equity are likely to move in opposite
directions for households and pensions. If the real pre—tax interest rate
remains unchanged, the pensions have a constant real yield on debt while the
yield on equity falls slightly because of the extra taxes paid at the corporate
level. For households, the real net—of—tax yield on debt falls sharply while
the real yield on equity falls by less. Households would thus be induced to
sell debt to pension funds and hold more equity directly.
The uncertainty of inflation influences the optimal extent of pension
indexing and the likely composition of pension assets. Without indexing, the
vested pension obligations are nominal long—term liabilities of the firm. The
firm can hedge these liabilities by holding long—term bonds. Of course, firms
may nevertheless invest in equities because they believe that the equity yield
is high enough to compensate for the reduced hedging. But, since the extra risk
of equity investment is borne by the firm's shareholders, the employees who par——22—
ticipate in the pension plan should earn an implicit nominal return on their
foregone wages that is only equal to the nominal return on riskiess bonds.
A fully indexed pension would make all pension obligations real.
Long—term bonds are clearly an inappropriate investment for funding such real
obligations. Stocks can provide a hedge against price level uncertainties only
by accepting substantial general uncertainty. Zvi Bodie (1980) has emphasized
that a portfolio with a minimum—variance real return would be invested almost
corrletely in short—term debt (with a small amount in commodity futures) and
that the expected return on such a portfolio is approximately zero. If
employees are so risk averse that they choose a fully indexed pension, the
implicit real return that they earn on foregone wages should therefore also be
approximately zero. Again, firms may invest in equities, but the shareholders
rather than the pensioners should receive any extra yield in return for bearing
that risk.
If employees choos-e a partially indexed pension, i.e., one in which
benefits rise less than one—for—one with the price level or in which benefits
depend on the return on the pension fund assets, the firm can invest in a way
that permits giving a higher return to pension participants while compensating
shareholders for any additional risk that they bear. The optimal extent of pen-
sion indexing depends on the risk aversion of employees and the cost, in terms
ofthereduction in the expected yield, of investing pension assets to produce a
constantreal return.
As Paul Samuelson (1958) noted years ago, an unfunded social security
program can provide an annuity with an implicit real rate of return equal to the—23—
real growth rate of the econorrr, probably about 3 percent a year over the next
decade or longer. Although 3 percent is substantially less than the real return
of more than 10 percent that the nation as a whole earns on additions to the
stock of plant and equipment (Feldstein and Poterba, 1980), the political
pressure to substitute unfunded Social Security benefits for private pensions
(or vice versa) is likely to depend on the real after—tax yield thatpartly
indexed pensions can offer and on the associated risk. If employees were
completely risk averse, the low 3 percent yield on Social Security would look
good in comparison to Bodiets zero yield on a minimum—variance real return port-
folio.But if employees are willing to accept the risk inherent in a partially
indexed pension, they can expect to receive an implicit yield that is much
greater than three percent.
In summary, the form and funding of private pensions will probably
change in the coming decade if inflation continues at recent levels but, unless
employees become much more risk averse, private pensions are likely to continue
to finance a growing share of retirement consumption.
6. Future Research
The substantial size and rapid growth of private pensions makes it
important to understand their impact on capital markets and capital formation
From the basic problem of pension liability measurement to the more complex
issue of the impact of unfunded obligations on shareholder consumption, we are
only beginning to do the necessary research. This paper has indicated a number
of questions on which further research should be done. How do employeest ear—
flings reflect their accruing pension benefits? Why do firms not take advan——2)4—
tage of the tax benefits of full and immediate funding? How do financial
markets and financial institutions respond to the extent of a company's pension
fund? Andhowdoes the existence of partly funded private pensions influence the
nation's aggregate rate of saving? As the answers to these questions become
known, we will better understand the impact of private pensions on the American
economy.—25—
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